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DYING IN THE NEW COUNTRY
MARIVIC WYNDHAM
Before the great Cold War diasporawrenched millions of Latin
Americans from their homelands and
thrust them to the fortunes — and
misfortunes — of foreign lands, most of
us from the region had assumed that the
land of our birth would naturally also be
the land of our death. Cemetery plots
confirmed the passing of the generations,
but they also confirmed our expectations
that one day we too would join our
ancestors in that same sacred family
space. Visits to these plots formed part
of family life: to mark birthdays, Mother’s
and Father’s Days, and other special
anniversaries. Sadness mingled with a
deep sense of belonging on those
occasions, as young children, parents and
grandparents pilgrimaged as one in this
time-honoured ritual of remembrance
and solidarity with our dead. Family
plots were an extension of our family
homes, they completed the circle of life
and death.
In the case of my own family, when
the unthinkable happened, and my
parents’ ageing generation of Cuban
American exiles found themselves
marooned indefinitely on foreign shores,
the spectre of death in someone else’s
land seemed the cruellest blow of their
long years of exile. They were not the first
Cuban exiles to die so near, yet so far from
their beloved island. Exile movements
had always been part of Cuban history.1
But they were our parents. That the
writing had been on the wall for a long
time made little difference when the time
came. That, at least in part, they had
conspired in the culture of denial that
prevented them from preparing them-
selves for this eventuality, also made no
difference. These were our dead and
something perverse seemed to overtake
the natural order of things.
Cuban American exile has a history
of over two centuries. Since the nineteenth
century, Cubans have turned to the Big
Brother to the North for political stability
and economic opportunity. The wars of
independence (1868–1878, 1895–1898), the
struggles of the young republic and the
frequent, often sudden changes in the
political life of the country of the first half
of the twentieth century all contributed
to Cuban emigration to the United States.2
The most recent wave of migration is
the Cold War diaspora that began on 1
January 1959 with the overthrow of the
government of Fulgencio Batista by Fidel
Castro’s revolutionary forces. By far the
most lengthy of waves — forty-three years
and still counting — it also dwarfs all
previous ones in numbers. By April 1961,
when the Bay of Pigs invasion took place,
there were 135 000 Cubans in Miami; five
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years later, that figure was 210 000. By
1973 more than half a million Cubans had
left the island, most of them settling in
Miami. The figures continued to rise. One
in every eleven Cubans now reside
outside the island, and of these one-and-
a-quarter million Cuban exiles, the
majority reside in the United States,
mainly in or around Dade County, which
houses the city of Miami.3
The majority of the Cubans who
arrived after 1959 came during three
distinct periods: immediately after the
Revolution, from 1959–1962; during the
‘freedom flights’ of 1965–1973; and
during the ‘Mariel boatlife’ of 1980.
Typically, the first to bear the impact of
the revolution and thus to leave Cuba
were the middle and upper classes. Later
migrants have increasingly been more
representative of Cuban society, not just
in socio-economic terms but also in racial,
ethnic and geographic terms.4
The focus of this paper is on that first
generation of Cuban exiles who fled in
the period immediately following the
Revolution: 1959–1962. Many were
literally fleeing for their lives, implicated
in the crimes committed during the
regime of Fulgencio Batista. Many were
not.5  Some fled the island not out of fear
of political persecution, but out of concern
for ‘the radicalisation of Cuban society’.6
My father was one. But whatever their
political backgrounds and loyalties, this
group shared a ‘moment of departure’
that would set them apart from later
arrivals.
Around this moment would develop
a peculiar culture of exile — a culture of
denial — resonances of which can be
heard and felt to this day: in Miami’s
family living rooms, in cafés and
restaurants in Calle Ocho, in the press and
even in the official pronouncements of
United States leaders, including President
George W. Bush. Three myths, I would
argue, grow from this moment of crisis:
three myths that together underpin the
culture and rhetoric of denial that is the
legacy of that first generation of Cuban
American exiles.
First, the myth of a forced departure:
they did not leave Cuba voluntarily; they
were forced to leave. “‘We never chose
to come here to the United States. Fidel
Castro expelled us, and we were forced
to go into exile, forced to go to Miami.’”7
Secondly, the myth of a quick return,
by courtesy, it was hoped — and urged
— on successive US presidents, of yet
another North American intervention in
Cuba’s internal affairs. For decades, my
father stood ready to join ‘the Marines’
when, as he expected, the American
government would finally ‘come to its
senses’ and liberate Cuba from
communism. The reasons went beyond
the ideological. The Castro government’s
nationalisation of American property
would surely, the logic went, prompt US
intervention in the island.8  The dismal
failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April
1961, an operation sponsored and
financed by the US Government, may
have sparked the first major wave of
internal migration of Cuban exiles from
Miami to other American cities, but it did
little to undermine the myth of a quick
return.
Thirdly, the myth of La Cuba de Ayer
(The Cuba of Yesterday). Unlike those
who followed them in the ‘freedom
flights’ of only a few years later, the
departure of that early group of exiles had
been typically sudden and thus
unprepared. They had no time to
experience and assimilate the ‘new’ Cuba
that was unfolding and continues to
unfold. The Cuba they took with them
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into exile was frozen in time. This Cuba
— La Cuba de Ayer — would remain
stubbornly and tragically their version of
the ‘real’ Cuba, one that would grow into
mythical proportions as the years and
decades of exile dragged on and on.
Concrete manifestations of pre-
revolutionary Cuban society alive and
well in Miami — in the form of schools,
businesses and organisations that shut
down in Cuba and reopened in exile9  —
helped sustain the myth.
The new Cuban émigrés perceived
themselves as exiles, not immigrants, and
least of all fully fledged citizens in the new
land.
They had no intention of beginning life
anew as norteamericanos. They fervently
believed they would return to their
homeland once a more tolerable
government replaced Fidel Castro’s. In
this faith, they were sustained by the long
history of American intervention in
Cuba’s internal affairs, from the time of
our wars of independence onwards.10
As they waited to return to the
homeland, these early exiles ‘focused
their energies on survival’.11  Theirs was
the case of creating, out of what was then
only a vacuum, a life for themselves and
their families, and maybe a future colony
for fellow exiles. My father and others like
him — professional, well-to-do, with
political links with previous Cuban
governments — had it, in a sense, the
roughest. Many had been caught by
surprise by the swiftness with which the
situation had changed. Unprepared for
exile, some had not thought to transfer
their accounts overseas. Nonetheless, it
was they who built the nests that swarms
of relatives and friends later made their
first stop in exile. It was their newfound
businesses that would later employ new
arrivals. It also fell on them to establish
semi-official relations with the American
Government: setting themselves up as the
conscience and the voice of free Cuba. In
short, it was they who set up the
foundations for the infrastructure —
familial, economic, political, moral — on
which the Cuban exile stands today. Most
importantly, they set the tone for what
was to follow. Money might be scarce and
the future uncertain, but there was plenty
of hope and fire here. It was only, after
all, a matter of time before the situation
was resolved through American
intervention.
This kind of confidence in a brighter
future helped to ease what was proving,
for many of these exiles, a difficult
transition. For the head of family, it meant
setting aside questions of dignity and
long-term financial security and getting
on with whatever job he could find. For
his wife, the idea that this was only a
temporary arrangement helped to ease
her loss of status and of that
infrastructure which had in Cuba
typically provided her (in the case of my
mother, for example) with a cook,
laundress cum ironing lady, general
cleaning woman, chauffeur and gardener.
Our house in Cuba stood exactly as we’d
left it for years after: ready to receive us
at any time. Most of the staff had
remained, all our belongings were still in
place: awaiting our return. As odd as it
may seem to have maintained two homes
— one in Cuba, one in Miami — and two
identities — one of citizen, one of exile —
these arrangements helped many to come
to terms slowly, gradually, with what was
happening to their lives.
This blend of the practical and the
idealistic — of Cuban get-up-and-go, on
the one hand, and blind faith in an
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American solution to the crisis, on the
other — informs the history of today’s
Cuban exile community. The practical
impulse ensures that life goes on, and
makes the best of it. The idealistic impulse
maintains the fantasy of a return home,
courtesy of the knight in shining armour
who once before helped rid Cuba of a
foreign power. Despite barriers of
language and culture, the bulk of that
135 000-odd contingent integrated
quickly and seamlessly into Miami’s
workforce, creating a vibrant business
community that lifted the local economy
and drew other immigrants to the area.
In practical terms, in other words, they
survived admirably well.
But they never assimilated. For some
forty years now, these exiles have lived
lives of ‘triumphant ambiguity’.12  They
have ‘camped’ and they have thrived —
both at the same time.13  As one exile
explained:
{We are} pro-American, but we are not
Americans, not yet anyway. We won’t
even know what we are until things
actually change in Cuba, until we have
the possibility of going back. Once the
exile is over, things will change, because
we Cubans will finally have the freedom
to make up our own minds about whether
we want to be immigrants or go home.14
That such an ambiguity could persist
for over four decades has in large part to
do with the fact that for this special
generation of exiles — the wealthy classes
of pre-Castro Cuban society — the
country where they ‘camped’ had always
been part of their mental map of ‘home’.
In pre-Castro days, the Cuban and the
American had increasingly been
indistinguishable in the fabric of Cuban
life; such had been the insinuation of
American culture — tastes, values,
assumptions, expectations — into the
native culture. And not only in popular
culture. The fact that we grew to think of
entertainers like Nat King Cole, and
movie stars like Fred Astaire and Ginger
Rogers as our own was one thing. But
more important still were the institutions
that shaped our minds and our values
from childhood onwards. Here
Americans had, if not a monopoly, then
their fair share of two of the country’s
most powerful forces — religion and
education, church and school — which,
in turn, formed the basis of the country’s
educational system. There were also the
personal exchanges going on all the time
between individuals of the two countries.
Usually invisible and unrecorded, this
kind of contact was immensely important
in shaping the Cuban-American
relationship at grassroots level. The
endless flow of Americans to Cuba — on
business or pleasure, to study, to visit
friends, even to live there for a time —
made our Big Brother to the North
accessible and real.
This had been a two-way relationship.
Before the Revolution, these exiles had
travelled to the US regularly and
sometimes for long periods, for business
and for pleasure. As Cuba had been the
playground of rich Americans, so had the
United States been the playground of rich
Cubans. But the US was not just a fair-
weather friend. And this is an important
point. As well as the site of fun, frivolous
times, it had also been the main comfort
and refuge in times of trouble. It had been
home-in-exile for generations of Cubans
fleeing from the latest dictator, or the
latest coup. Indeed, the first Cuban to
seek political refuge in the United States
did so in 1823, the priest Felix Varela y
Morales who sought refuge in Saint
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Augustine, Florida, after being
condemned to death by the Spanish
authorities for demanding autonomy for
certain provinces in the island. Fellow
rebels eventually joined him, and they
established there the first real focus of
Cuban opposition to Spanish rule. By the
second half of the nineteenth century,
their numbers had grown to some 2000
Cubans, who were now scattered in the
region between Tampa and Key West.
They were mainly tobacco growers and
their contributions helped to finance the
war of independence.
The second major wave of Cuban
migration to the States was sparked by
Fulgencio Batista’s coup d’ état in 1952, and
it continued until 1959 when the right-
wing dictator himself fled Cuba for Spain.
By then some 15 000 of his political
opponents had congregated in the States,
largely around the Miami area. Plain facts
and statistics only tell part of the story of
Cuban-American relations. For every
individual making that crossing, brief or
lengthy as it may have been, there lies a
tissue of human connectedness between
the two cultures. Exile by definition is a
negation of home. But the close links
between the two peoples went a long way
towards mitigating the worst of the exilic
condition.
My own family had sought political
refuge in Miami for a time in the early
1950s. For over two years we lived in ‘Mr
Billy’s House’. My sisters attended the
local school, and my parents carried on
with the business of life. When many
years later we passed the street of ‘Mr
Billy’s House’ and found it gone, it was
as if something of ours had gone too.
Miami and ‘Mr Billy’s House’ and the
friends we made then may have been
American, but they were also part of our
family world. Indeed, if one were to draw
my parents’ generation of exiles’ mental
maps of ‘home’, one would find not
simply the shape of the island of Cuba,
but one that looped dramatically to
embrace the Florida Peninsula.
Ironically, it was this close familiarity
with the country and culture of exile that
both softened the extremes of the exile
experience and encouraged the
‘triumphant ambiguity’ of which Rieff
speaks. Cuban exiles may have been
turning to the United States for political
refuge for over two centuries. But there
had always been an eventual return to the
island. Until now. Thus, despite the
prosperity of these exiles, they continued
to live — metaphorically at least — with
their bags packed and a strong fantasy
alive in their hearts of a return to the
island. The fact that, with the passage of
time, such ideas ‘became increasingly
chimerical did little to lessen their
authority’. Over the decades, ‘the facts of
exile’ had become all but inseparable from
‘the wound of exile’: a wound that would
only heal when they returned to the
island.15
Few of that first wave of exiles
contemplated — or if they did, they did
not dare articulate to their families and
friends — the idea of ‘return’ before the
fall of Castro. A visit to Castro’s Cuba
would have been savagely condemned as
a betrayal. Not only to ‘the cause’, but to
the motherland herself. Throughout the
first decade of exile, the 1960s:
it was, in any event, forbidden to the
Cuban Americans … to visit the island.
For the revolutionaries, and, for that
matter, in the eyes of many ordinary
Cubans who had chosen to remain, the
Miami community were traitors, people
to be excoriated as gusanos, ‘worms’, and
shunned if ever they were encountered.
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Though Cubans continued to go into
exile in Miami, ‘once they had left there
was no question of their ever returning
even in the most extraordinary of
circumstances’.16 By the time a radical
shift in Washington’s policy towards
Castro’s Cuba in the late 1970s opened
for a brief time the possibility of return
visits to the island, as the Carter
administration attempted a policy of
détente, the cement had long settled in
Miami’s exile community’s political
stance on such visits.17  Even though in
that short interlude and subsequently, the
possibilities for return visits have existed,
and many later arrivals have embraced
the opportunity to visit their relatives in
the island, the rigidly set position of that
first wave of exiles on the matter
continues to prevail in the dominant
political culture of Miami exile.
Beneath the political rhetoric of
rejection of such options, there lay larger
issues. To return to Cuba, even if only for
a brief visit, would have been to confront
impossible realities: that they could of
their own will return to the beloved
island, that they could of their own free
will leave her again, and that perhaps
after the pain of such a visit they had
discovered there was no Cuba del Ayer
to nurture in their old age. Thus the
emotional grip of the illusion of a ‘quick
return’ that no amount of
disappointments — the Bay of Pigs, the
behind-the-scenes negotiations after the
missile crisis that left Castro more firmly
implanted on the island than ever before,
the collapse of the Soviet Camp that did
not bring about the expected collapse of
Soviet Cuba — could dispel. Forty years
and three major setbacks later, the
rhetoric of denial remains. For these
exiles, ‘dying in a new country’ was never
the issue. That would be the by-product
of a larger issue — a larger tragedy — of
not dying in the old country: a country
they could not bear to admit they had left
voluntarily, a country they insisted lay
waiting for their return, a country which
their collective imaginations had
fashioned into a veritable paradise lost.
The peculiarities of Cuban American
exile and exile politics have prompted
some to ponder on the underlying causes.
Long before the advent of Castro’s
revolution — as the writer of the book
Exile: Cuba in the heart of Miami (1994)
argues —  the sense that one did not
willingly leave the island to settle
elsewhere was already well entrenched
in the Cuban psyche. Those who could
afford it, would travel widely and often.
They might send their children to school
in the United States. But they would
always return. Rieff quotes from one
inside that culture:
To leave Cuba was an admission of
failure. And that took on a moral
dimension as well. The person who left
was somehow lessened morally, rather
like an Israeli nowadays who chooses not
to remain in that country. Actually, I think
that one of the reasons that Cubans in
Miami have been so traumatised by their
exile — after all, ours is not the only exile
in the history of the world; we haven’t
suffered more than anyone else has ever
suffered — is that this sanction against
leaving Cuba was already present in the
Cuban psyche before the revolution.18
La Cuba del Ayer — their paradise
lost — would always dwarf the realities
of life in the United States. As one of
countless success stories of Cuban
American exiles, an entrepreneur famous
for having directed the first Cuban-
owned bank in the US, the Republic
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National Bank, declared:
It will always be difficult for Americans
to understand the realities as we Cubans
in Miami see them. Immigrants want to
assimilate because, by and large, they
have brought with them unhappy
memories of their native countries. But
we don’t have bad memories of Cuba.
Before 1959, we did not think the US was
better. We thought Cuba was better. And
most of us still do. It isn’t that I’m not
grateful to the United States, or that I
don’t love the United States. I do. But even
though this country has been very good
to me, even after thirty-three years I don’t
feel comfortable here. And the reason is
simple. I would rather be in Cuba.19
One might ask: which Cuba? And the
answer would predictably be: la Cuba del
Ayer.
So much for the rhetoric. What of the
reality? This is as varied and complex as
the individuals who compose Cuban-
American exile at any given time. This is
why I would like to share with you a
personal anecdote of the new country:
one that reflects the greater complexities
and ironies of the realities of Cuban
American exile: past and present.
In my own family, an earlier political
exile in the early 1950s had, as I
mentioned earlier, taken us to Miami.
There my paternal grandmother died and
was buried. This was to be her temporary
resting place, awaiting the time when
things in Cuba ‘improved’ and we could
transport her remains to their rightful
place at the family plot at Cementerio
Colón in Havana. It was never a question
of ‘if’ but of ‘when’. As it happened, we
returned and she stayed. Before too long
another exile had overtaken our plans to
re-settle in Cuba and, in 1959, we found
ourselves once again living ‘temporarily’
in Florida. Meanwhile my grandmother
remained in her temporary resting place
at Woodlawn Cemetery in Miami.
Pilgrimages to her grave-in-exile were a
regular part of family life. And for many
decades, it was understood that she —
and we — were living on borrowed soil
and borrowed time. The day would soon
come when we both — the dead and the
living exiles — would return to the land
of our birth. It was only with the death of
my father in the early 1990s that we
realised that my grandmother’s
temporary grave had now become her
final resting place: my father’s grave in
the same cemetery ironically conferring
permanence on hers.
The gravestones in Colón and in
Woodlawn are witnesses to the long
diaspora of Cuban dead. Woodlawn
Cemetery in Miami and Cementerio
Colon in Havana — two pillars of one
Cuban cemetery stretching across the
treacherous tides of the Florida Straits —
hold in their collective tombs and
mausoleums a continuum of names and
dates that allow us to trace faithfully the
personal and political fortunes and
misfortunes of generations of Cubans.
Where the dates in the gravestone ‘there’
stop, they begin ‘here’. Often — and sadly
— so does their level of care and
maintenance. Many of what were once the
well-tended suburbs of the dead in Colón,
are now grown sloppy and weedy. The
reason is obvious. In Miami’s Woodlawn,
on the other hand, a veritable garden
blooms in the tombs of dead Cuban exiles.
Families visit regularly and tend to the
graves of their dead with the same care
and devotion they shower on their living.
The conundrum goes to the heart of
the Cuban American diaspora: with
heavy hearts we bury our dead in a new
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country, yet we know that, for the
moment at least, here is where we want
them, safe and cared for in exile. The
rituals of caring for our dead run deep in
the psyche and imagination of Latin
Americans all over the world. Aban-
doning our dead in the old country and
burying our dead in the new: both are
part of the diaspora of mourning and grief
that is life in exile.
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